We critically examine the implications of the most favored nation (MFN) clause under asymmetric environmental standards. Using an oligopolistic intra-industry trade model, we show that tari¤ discrimination leads to an environmentally bene…cial trade diversion and higher world welfare than MFN.
Recently, there has been growing public concern related to the degradation of the global commons (i.e. ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity and climate change). The shift from the local to the global scale has rendered environmental problems more visible and suggests a critical link between environmental and trade policies. While full cooperation yields the economically optimal outcome, an inequitable sharing of the burden of pollution abatement, incentives to free-ride, and di¢ culties in enforcement make cooperation among countries di¢ cult.
Presently, environmental standards di¤er substantially across countries. Producers in countries with stricter environmental standards have worried about the impact of those standards on their competitiveness in world markets whereas governments and …rms in countries with less strict standards have expressed concern about new barriers being erected against their exports.
1 As a result, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been involved in the discussion of environmental policy and its impact on trade and welfare. At the heart of WTO is the principle of non-discrimination -embodied in the most-favored-nation (MFN)
clause in Article I of the General Agreements on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) -under which WTO members are required to treat products from all other members equally. However, the economic case for non-discrimination from a pure trade policy perspective is hardly obvious (Caplin and Krishna, 1988 , Horn and Mavroidis, 2001 , Saggi and Yildiz, 2005 .
In this paper, we examine the implications of the MFN principle as opposed to tari¤ discrimination when environmental standards are asymmetric across countries. 2 Under an oligopolistic intra-industry trade model, we address the following questions. 3 What is the pattern of tari¤s under MFN and discrimination? Is MFN adoption necessarily desirable from an aggregate world welfare perspective? We show that when countries deviate from 1 The linkage between environmental and trade policies has been examined by Conrad (1993) , Barrett (1994) , Kennedy (1994) , Ulph (1996) , and Engel (2004) , among others. 2 Article XX of the GATT includes important environmental-related provisions that override other obligations of the GATT, including potentially MFN. See the key measures in paragraphs (b) and (g). 3 See Hwang and Mai (1991), Choi (1995) and Saggi (2004) .
MFN and tari¤ discriminate, environmentally bene…cial trade diversion occurs via punishing countries that are free riding in the supply of a global public good. In this way, a larger share of world production is undertaken by countries with stricter environmental standards and higher world welfare obtains under discrimination relative to MFN.
Model
We develop a simple oligopoly model of international trade between n countries (indexed by i = 1:::n). Firms produce a joint product: a homogenous traded good x and pollution resulting from the production of x. The pollution generated is a transboundary public bad that a¤ects all countries equally, regardless of the point of origin. Each country contains a single pro…t-maximizing …rm and has a predetermined pollution abatement standard i [0; 1] ; such as a limit on CO 2 emissions or the extent of land-use restrictions in biodiversity-sensitive areas. Costs to …rm i are C(
x iz denotes the total output produced in country i and sold across all markets, and is the marginal cost of abatement. 4 Given the abatement standards, emissions by …rm i are x i (1 i ). Note that when no abatement is undertaken, emissions are equal to output level while emissions are zero if abatement is maximal. Aggregate damages are then given by = !
is the marginal bene…t of abatement (or marginal damages).
We assume that inverse demand
x zi is linear in each country, where x zi denotes the output sold by …rm z in country i, and …rms compete in quantities (Cournot competition). In this case, …rms make independent decisions regarding how much to sell in each market (i.e. markets are segmented). 5 Thus, it is su¢ cient to focus on only one country's market equilibrium. Country i's tari¤ schedule is a 1xn vector: t i (t 1i ; :::; t ni )
where …rm z faces a speci…c tari¤ t zi when exporting to country i and t ii = 0 for all i.
In order to critically examine the implications of MFN when environmental standards di¤er across countries, we consider a two-stage game under two tari¤ regimes: MFN and discrimination. In the …rst stage, given exogenous abatement standards and the tari¤ regime, countries simultaneously choose their tari¤ schedules. Then, …rms compete in quantities.
MFN versus Tari¤ Discrimination
We obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. There are n …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization for each …rm in each market. Firm j's pro…ts from exports to country i are given by
where
x zi . Firm j's …rst-order condition yields
Solution for the product market equilibrium leads to the following output levels:
At the trade policy stage, countries simultaneously choose their tari¤ schedules to maximize their own welfare. Due to linear costs and market segmentation, strategic independence of tari¤s obtains so that the own tari¤s of country i do not e¤ect its export pro…ts ( X z6 =i iz (t i )). Under tari¤ discrimination, country i solves:
ii (t i ) the pro…ts of …rm i in its own market, T R i (t ji , t ki ) = P z6 =i t zi x zi country i's tari¤ revenue, and (t i ; t i ) the environmental damage su¤ered by each country.
Solution of the welfare maximization problem in (4) yields the following optimal discriminatory tari¤s
where i represents total protection under tari¤ discrimination:
such that
Asymmetric abatement standards across countries yield di¤erent mark-up levels for each exporter. This gives country i an incentive to discriminate across its exporters:
Proposition 1 Under tari¤ discrimination, the following results hold: (i) country i's optimal tari¤ on country j is higher than its tari¤ on country k i¤ country j's abatement standard is lower than that of country k: t ji t ki i¤ k j ; (ii) The true cost ranking of countries is preserved: k +t ki j +t ji i¤ ! while it is reversed:
The …rst part of the proposition implies that by being biased against (in favor of) the countries with low (high) abatement standards, discrimination causes environmentally bene…cial trade diversion. In other words, tari¤ discrimination works as a punishment mechanism for the countries free riding in the supply of the global public good (those with less stringent environmental policy). Note that the trade diversion becomes larger as both the marginal bene…t of abatement, !, and the marginal cost of abatement, , get larger. The second part of the proposition immediately follows from equations in (5) and (6) and argues even a stronger result: when ! exceeds , the discrimination is so strong that the exporters with higher abatement standards gain competitive advantage over the ones with lower standards.
The problem under MFN di¤ers from the problem in (4) in only one respect: country i imposes the same tari¤ t i on all exporters and solves M ax
Due to symmetric treatment under MFN, it is immediate that
where M i represents the total protection under MFN. It is proved by Saggi (2004) that under
Cournot competition with constant marginal costs (as assumed here), total protection under discrimination i does not change when it adopts MFN tari¤s:
This implies that relative to discrimination, MFN adoption does not change the equilibrium price and total imports while it has distributional implications for its trading partners. Using the optimal tari¤s in (5) and (9), we obtain
Proposition 2 Country i's discriminatory tari¤ is higher than its MFN tari¤ on country j's export i¤ country j's abatement standard is lower than the average abatement standard of all exporters to country i:
As might be expected, countries always have unilateral incentives to discriminate since MFN constrains its choice set without conferring any bene…t in return. The above proposition informs us that when a country deviates from Article I and discriminates, the trading partner with the highest abatement standard necessarily gains while the one with the lowest standard necessarily loses. The impacts on the other countries depend on the distribution of the abatement standards across countries.
World Welfare
Article I of the GATT requires each member country to adopt MFN on a multilateral basis rather than unilaterally. To this end, we consider two scenarios, one where all countries have to abide by Article I and another where they are free to discriminate. Given the fact that discrimination causes an environmentally bene…cial trade diversion, is discrimination necessarily desirable from the perspective of aggregate world welfare? We de…ne world welfare as the sum of individual countries'welfare. The comparison between world welfare
Note that as long as n 3, the term inside the square brackets is positive since it can be written as a sum of squares.
Proposition 3 World welfare is higher under discrimination relative to MFN unless the marginal bene…t of abatement (!) is su¢ ciently low relative to marginal cost of abatement ( ):
To see the intuition for this result, consider the situation where marginal bene…t of abatement (!) approaches zero. Then, the cost of abatement becomes pure production cost so that under discrimination each country imposes higher tari¤s on low cost producers, thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption eliminates this trade diversion and improves world welfare. On the other hand, when the marginal bene…t of abatement exceeds the minimum threshold, a larger share of world production is undertaken by countries with more stringent environmental policy under discrimination than under MFN, leading to an improvement in world welfare.
Since abatement standards di¤er across countries, tari¤ discrimination generates asymmetric losses and bene…ts for adopting and recipient countries relative to MFN. Therefore, it is also worth asking which country's deviation from MFN bene…ts world welfare the most?
We make the following comparison: 
The intuition is as follows. By discriminating, only country a imposes higher (lower) tari¤s on all exporters with abatement standards below (above) the average . Tari¤ discrimination by any other country is either harmful for some countries with relatively high standards (above the average) or bene…cial for some countries with relatively low standards (below the average).
Conclusion
Based on the argument that asymmetries in the economic environment of countries are important determinants of the desirability of MFN, we examine the case where environmental standards di¤er across countries. Under MFN, countries with weak environmental standards gain competitive advantage without being treated di¤erently in export markets. By contrast, these countries face higher tari¤s under discrimination that diminish or even reverse their cost advantage. As a result, environmentally bene…cial trade diversion occurs, leading to a higher world welfare under discrimination relative to MFN.
